Ideas from 'Truth-makers and dependence' by David Liggins [2012], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Metaphysical Grounding' (ed/tr Correia,F/Schnieder,B) [CUP 2012,978-1-107-02289-8]].
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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17325
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Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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17318
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Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths?
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
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17320
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Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
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17326
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The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
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17327
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Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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17322
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Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
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17324
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'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
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17321
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Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain
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17323
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If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist
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